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The Motnent of Silence in Public Schools: 
Valid Educational Activity or AtteIllpt to 
Breach the Church---State Wall? 
P roponents of school prayer real-ize that a constitutional amend-ment is needed to get specific 
prayer into the nation's public schools,1 
and such an amendment is strongly sup-
ported by nationalleaders.2 What is not 
clear, however, is the status of the 
"moment of silence" in public schools. 
On April 2, 1984, the Supreme Court 
heard oral argument in the case of Wal-
lace v. Jaffree,3 dealing with the constitu-
tionality of an Alabama statute calling 
for moment of silence in Alabama pub-
lic schools.4 Hopefully, the Court will 
issue a definitive ruling on the applica-
bility of the three-prong Establishment 
Clause testS as it applies to the burgeoning 
moment of silence movement.6 
It is the purpose of this article to in-
vestigate the historical foundations of the 
Establishment Clause as it has evolved 
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from constitutional formulation to the 
present day, and to analyze the evolution 
of case law with specific regard to the 
growing controversy surrounding the 
moment of silence in public schools. This 
subject and the issues surrounding it are 
of great concern to this writer, not just 
because of my years as a public school 
teacher but because of my firm belief that 
prayers are the province of religious in-
stitutions and family, not the business of 
school boards.7 
A full understanding of the Establish-
ment Clause requires an examination of 
the historical development of American 
religious philosophy during the forma-
tive years of our republic.s There were 
many evils that forced our ancestors to 
flee their European homeland,9 and free-
dom of religion was a major factor in the 
rapid settlement of the New W orld. 10 
The right to worship as one pleased at-
tracted displaced settlers from all nations 
who were determined to exercise this 
right upon arrival in the New World.l1 
Unfortunately, however, some of the 
groups which fled to this country to es-
cape the religious persecution of Europe 
tried to force their particular religious 
beliefs upon other colonists. 12 Laws 
authorizing the collection of tax monies 
to support the government-favored 
churches were allowed, and religious 
bigotry and intolerance were widespread, 
particularly towards non-Christian 
religions .13 
It is remarkable that the term "relig_ 
ion" is not defined anywhere in the Con-
stitution. Indeed, the only reference to a 
Supreme Being is in the date of the Con-
stitution itself, i.e., "in the year of our 
Lord."14 This lack of Constitutional de-
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finition has been a concern to courts and 
commentators throughout the years, 
since the Establishment Clause lends it-
self to any number of viable interpreta-
tions. 1s The resulting confusion is suc-
cinctly expressed by columnist George 
Will: 
The authors of the "establishment" 
clause wanted to guarantee that 
government action would be im-
partial among religions. They did 
not intend to require that it be neu-
tral between religion and secular-
ism. Still less did they intend what 
the Supreme Court has mandated-
that any law must have a "secular 
legislative purpose and a primary 
effect that neither advances nor in-
hibits religion." 16 
For the time being, however, the Estab-
lishment Clause controversy seems cen-
tered on viability of a moment of silence 
in public schools. 
Whenever religious activities become 
involved with public education, the ex-
tent of governmental involvement is 
measured by the three-pronged Estab-
lishment Clause test.!? The formulation 
of this test began with the 1947 decision 
of Everson v. Board of Education. 18 Despite 
upholding the validity of using public 
funds to transport children to parochial 
schools, the Everson Court stated clearly 
the constitutional parameters of the First 
Amendment: 
The "establishment of religion" 
clause of the First Amendment 
means at least this: Neither a state 
nor the Federal Government can 
set up a church. Neither can pass 
laws which aid one religion, aid all 
religions, or prefer one religion 
over another. Neither can force nor 
influence a person to go or remain 
away from church against his will 
or force him to profess a belief or 
disbelief in any religion. No person 
can be punished for entertaining or 
professing religious beliefs or dis-
beliefs, for church attendance or 
non-attendance. No tax in any 
amount, large or small, can be levied 
to support any religious activity or 
institutions, whatever they may be 
called, or whatever form they may 
adopt to teach or practice religion. 
Neither a state nor the Federal 
Government can, openly or secretly, 
participate in the affairs of any reli-
gious organizations or groups and 
vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, 
the clause against establishment of 
religion by law was intended to 
erect a "wall of separation between 
Church and State. "19 
This definitional statement was repeated 
the following year in McCollum v. Board 
of Education.20 By declaring release school 
time for religious education unconstitu-
tional, the McCollum Court showed it had 
adopted a broad interpretation of Everson 
and placed an obligation of neutrality on 
government with respect to religion. 21 
The "high and impregnable wall" men-
tioned by the McCollum Court developed 
cracks four years later. In Zorach v. Clau-
son22 the Court retreated from the broad 
scope of the Everson-McCollum princi-
ple.23 The Zorach Court stated that the 
First Amendment "does not say that in 
every and all respects there shall be sepa-
ration of Church and State ... [it requires 
only that] there shall be no concert or 
union or dependency one on the other."24 
Prayers are -the 
province of religious 
institutions and 
family, not the 
business of school 
boards. 
The refusal to extend the McCollum 
decision to the similar facts ofZorach was 
based on a subtle distinction between the 
two cases. The Zorach Court found that 
the difference between the school system 
in McCollum and the school system in 
Zorach was that the public school author-
ities in McCollum were deeply involved 
in the religious-education programs while 
the Zorach authorities were not.2s The 
Zorach decision was of even greater im-
portance, however, because the Court 
elaborated two religiously oriented rea-
sons for its holding as well. The Zorach 
Court said that (l) accommodation to 
the spiritual needs of its citizens is an es-
tablished American tradition; and (2) 
not making such a concession would re-
sult in preference of atheists over be-
lievers.26 While this pro-religious logic 
did not repudiate the Everson-McCollum 
principle, greater tolerance for religious 
activities was clearly implied. This new 
tolerance produced a rash of seemingly 
conflicting decisions28 that served to dis-
tort the once definitive Everson pro-
nouncement. By 1962, the Court realized 
a new definition for Establishment Clause 
analysis was needed. 
Engel v. Vitale 29 provided the Supreme 
Court with the opportunity to make a 
definitive ruling regarding prayers in 
public schools, and by ruling against a 
state prayer the Court repaired, at least 
temporarily, the cracked wall of the 
church-state separation. In Engel, the 
New York State Board of Regents had 
composed a nondenominational prayer 
that was recited by students prior to the 
stmt of classes each day.30 In holding that 
the use of this prayer violated the Estab-
lishment Clause, the Court revived the 
Everson standard and stated flatly that 
"each separate government in this 
country should stay out of the business 
of writing or sanctioning official 
prayers. "31 
The next year, a similar problem re-
garding prayer in the public schools faced 
the Court in Abington School District v. 
Schempp.32 Schempp involved the reading 
of the Bible and a recitation of the Lord's 
prayer as a part of a school's opening 
exercises; it did not involve an official 
prayer composed by the state or a state 
agency. The Court, nevertheless, held 
that this activity violated the Establish-
ment Clause, affirming both its earlier 
ruling in EngeP3 as well as the Everson 
standard. The Schempp Court stated two 
requirements which had to be met for a 
statute to withstand Establishment Clause 
scrutiny. The statute in question must 
have: (1) a secular legislative purpose; 
and (2) a primary effect that neither ad-
vances nor inhibits religion.34 As the 
Court stated, "In the relationship be-
tween man and religion, the State is firmly 
committed to a position of neutrality. ','35 
Eight years later, the Supreme Court 
formally announced the test for Estab-
lishment Clause analysis. In Lemon v. 
Kurtzman36 the Court articulated the 
three-prong standard for Establishment 
Clause analysis: (1) the statute in ques-
tion must have a secular legislative pur-
pose; (2) the statute's principal or pri-
mary effect must be one that neither ad-
vances nor inhibits religion and (3) the 
statute must not foster an excessive gov-
ernment entanglement with religion,37 
Subsequent cases have reinforced the 
validity of this test, however inconsistent 
the results may be. 38 
While the specifics of the three-pronged 
test are firmly established, the exact scope 
of its application is far from clear and is 
subject to varying interpretations by judi-
cial districts. As stated by Chief]ustice 
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Burger in Kurtzman, "The line of separa-
tion, far from being a 'wall,' is a blurred, 
indistinct, and variable barrier depending 
on all the circumstances of a particular 
relationship. "39 Perhaps the most suc-
cinct comment was made by Mr. Justice 
White when he stated that "Establish-
ment Clause cases are not easy; they stir 
deep feelings, and [the Court is] divided 
among ourselves, perhaps reflecting the 
different views on this subject of the 
people of this country. "40 
The differing views of the people in 
this country on the subject of the Estab-
lishment Clause are clearly demonstrated 
in the moment of silence movement.41 In 
determining the applicability of the first 
prong of the test to moment of silence 
laws, i.e., that the statute in question have 
a secular purpose, courts have looked to 
the legislative history of the statute as 
well as the face of the statute itself. In 
Duffy v. Las Cruces Public Schools42 the 
plain language of the statute supported 
the Court's decision that the purpose of 
the statute was to establish prayer in 
public schools.43 In determining the de-
fendant's contention that the inclusion of 
the words "contemplation" and "medi-
tation" indicated the "neutral" intent of 
the legislature, the Court said it was clear 
that words were inserted "solely for the 
purpose of attempting to disguise the 
religious nature of the bill."44 In Beck v. 
McElrath, the Court determined the 
nonsecular purpose of the Tennessee 
statute by first determining the practical 
effect the language of the statute would 
have.45 The Court said: 
In the abstract it is true that "medi-
tation" and "reflection" upon per-
sonal beliefs can be viewed as carry-
ing meanings that do not touch 
upon religion. Individual terms 
within a statute are not to be con-
strued in a purely abstract sense or 
in a vacuum, however. As all terms 
in the statute are viewed together 
and accorded reasonable meaning, 
it is difficult to escape the conclu-
sion that the legislative purpose was 
advancement of religious exercises 
in the classroom. Ordinary princi-
ples of statutory construction do 
not comprehend the straining de-
fendants would urge upon the 
court.46 
This nonsecular conclusion was support-
ed by the Court's review of the legislative 
history of the bill, which revealed that 
the intent in passing the bill was "to 
establish prayer as a daily fixture in the 
public schools of Tennessee."47 
The second prong of the Establishment 
Clause test, that the statute have a pri-
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mary effect that neither advances nor in-
hibits religion, has generally been viewed 
in practical terms based on the actual ef-
fect a moment of silence would have. The 
Beck Court pointed out the prevailing 
legal sentiment: 
Unavoidably, students will un-
derstand that they are being en-
couraged not only to be silent, but 
also to engage in religious exercises. 
It cannot be seriously argued, and 
certainly cannot be assured, that 
nice distinctions concerning the 
potential meaning of "meditation" 
and "personal beliefs" will natu-
rally arise in the minds of public 
school students.48 
ttUnavoidably, students 
will understand that 
they are being 
encouraged not only to 
be silent, but also to 
engage in religious 
activities. " 
One columnist was more direct in his be-
lief that school children would, in prac-
tice, equate silence with prayer. 
When you're eight years old and 
all the kids around you bow their 
heads, you bow your head. When 
everyone is mumbling words, you 
mumble words. When they pause 
for a moment of silence, you do the 
same. And you do it not because 
you want to, but because you do 
not want to make a spectacle of 
yourself. What eight-year-old is 
going to raise his or her hand and 
say to the teacher, "I have a consti-
tutional right to be excused and I 
would like at this moment to do 
so?"49 
The third prong of the test, that the 
statute will result in excessive govern-
ment entanglement with religion, has 
again been viewed by courts in the light 
of practical application. A moment of 
silence in school implies that teachers 
will be responsible for supervising this 
activity, a contingency the Supreme 
Court has, in fact, already recognized. 50 
The Beck Court noted that as teachers and 
school officials perform their supervisory 
tasks, "public funds," though small in 
amount, are being used to promote a 
religious exercise. 51 Other courts have 
been more direct, stating flatly that "if the 
state must engage in continuing adminis-
trative supervision of nonsecular activity, 
church and state are excessively inter-
twined. "52 This entanglement would re-
sult even if the activity takes place before 
the opening of the school day. 53 
At present, the weight of authority in 
state and federal courts clearly holds that 
a state mandated "moment of silence" in 
public schools is unconstitutional. How-
ever, it is inescapable that a moment of 
silence is not per se unconstitutional,54 
and a properly worded and enacted bill 
may not violate the First Amendment. In 
fact, many people feel that a properly 
drafted moment of silence bill would be 
an ideal solution to the current debate 
between those who want a school prayer 
amendment and those who do not. Their 
logic goes as follows: If the moment of 
silence statute is not upheld, it is likely 
that the matter will be settled by the 
adoption of a constitutional amendment 
and this would invite the kind of religious 
involvement that must be avoided. As 
one periodical noted: 
Those resisting the [moment of 
silence] are bound to appear not as 
defenders of freedom of conscience 
but as doctrinaire secularists who 
do not want the public school day 
to be opened upon the transcen-
dant even for a fleeting moment. 55 
Such opinion would be regrettable and 
uncalled for, but it serves to demonstrate 
the confusion and discord that exists in 
the area of prayer in the public school. 
This writer looks forward to the 
Supreme Court's ruling on Wallace v. 
Jaffree. 56 While I feel strongly that a 
moment of silence in school, no matter 
how carefully and neutrally created by 
legislature, is nothing more than an ex-
cuse to break down the wall of church-
state separation and institute prayer in 
school, it cannot be denied that it is pos-
sible under the current Supreme Court 
guidelines to have a constitutionally 
permissible moment of silence in public 
schools. As the Court stated in Schempp, 
"the breach of neutrality that is today a 
trickling stream may all too soon become 
a raging torrent. "57 The moment of si-
lence in public schools is such a breach. 
Because the current three-prong test can 
be circumvented by a moment of silence, 
a new standard must be formulated and 
implemented by the Court; Wallace v. 
Jaffree provides the perfect vehicle. m 
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